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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the implication of the operational risk in the locally incorporated 
European Bank in Malaysia. The operational risk constitutes a small part of a bank’s risk profile which 
includes unpredicted measures that might possibly source the failure of the whole bank. Therefore, the 
bank has implemented permanent control plan methods which arise from the annual risk assessment 
plan. Moreover, the Permanent Control Plan for each department of the bank resulting in the process and 
procedure review on the risk assessment task to reduce or eliminate unwanted issues and problems arise 
from the process and system in the organisations. Each risk assessment activity with the permanent 
control plan was approved by the bank’s top level management before executed by phases in the year. 
There are 4 phases’ in the permanent control plan; monthly, quarterly, half yearly and yearly. In this study 
the researchers has looked into the half yearly control plan. The half yearly permanent control plan 
exercise executed by the Operational Risk Officer found non-compliance issues on a few department's 
work processes. As a result, a few key operational risk management implications faced by the bank with 
this incompliance activity. Besides that, the issues identified in this study was firm enough to address a 
major operational risk implication to the bank. Furthermore, there was no any action taken by the 
Permanent Control Manager to prevent this incompliance activity in future. As a conclusion, the results 
obtained from this study is necessary due to the operational loss and the reputational risks faced by the 
financial organization.  
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Introduction 
 
The Operational Risk comprises of a wide scale of mixed mode risks. The risks are business interruption, 
stakeholder dissatisfactions and implications on the organization, increased cost of products services in 
the organisations as well as employee health and safety hazards. It also includes other primary risks such 
as fraud, transaction failures, legal and regulatory breaches, inferior human technical performance, 
physical damage, and stakeholder safety and assets. These operational risk factors may cause huge 
financial losses directly or indirectly as well as reputational damages to the financial institutions. On the 
other hand, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 2015, interpreted the operational risk 
management as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal process, people and systems 
or from any other external events. In addition, it also includes legal risks, but eliminates strategic and 
reputational risk. To support this, there are few real incidences which took place that clearly indicates the 
existence of the operational risks and the risk management implications faced by the organisations. 
On a different not, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is a team of Banking and 
Financial Institutions regulatory consultants that was established by the Central Bank of Governors of the 
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Group of Ten Countries in 1974. From the basic ground of the Basel regulation of worldwide active 
financial institutions set, capital adequacy soon become the main emphasis of the BCBS. There was also 
a robust credit within the organisation for superseding multinational accord to reinforce the steadiness of 
the international financial institution system and to eliminate a foundation of reasonable dissimilarity 
arising from the differences in nationwide capital requirements. 
 
One of the incidents worth mentioning here is, the clear indication of the change in the estimated cost to 
the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), United States as the sum of money paid out of the Federal Deposits 
Insurance Corporations (FDIC) DIF to the investors that likely won’t be recovered by the sale of the bank’s 
internal and external assets properties.  
 
Table 1 shows the bank’s failures ranging from the year 2009 – 2016. This data was obtained from the 
analysis carried out by the Federal Deposits Insurance Corporations (FDIC) in August 2017.  According 
to the analysis, the costs of the bank failures for the past 8 years which encompasses 495 banks, amounts 
to a total of US$75,103,000,000. This may be due to the inappropriate management of the operational 
risk associated with other risks of the banking institutions. In addition, FDIC also declared that the bank’s 
failure was caused by the managerial weakness, internal routine control’s weakness and failure to prevent 
the frauds due to volatile economic conditions.   
 
Table 1 Bank Failures ranging from the year 2009 – 2016 in United States of America. 
No Year Bank Failure Cost to DIF 
(USD) Million 
No of Banks 
1 2009 38,732            140  
2 2010 22,904            157  
3 2011 7,945              92  
4 2012 2,785              51  
5 2013 1,165              24  
6 2014 399              18  
7 2015 894                8  
8 2016 279                5  
Total 75,103            495  
Source: Federal Deposits Insurance Corporations, (2017) United States of America (USA).  
 
The Figure 1 and Figure 2 below shows the comparison of the operational loss globally throughout the 
year of 2009 to 2016. Stringent Basel III regulations, had reduced the operational losses drastically from 
US$39 billion in 2009 to meagre US$279 million. In terms of percentage, the drop is at 137.82% which is 
indicates better operational risk management globally that helps in reduction of losses within the banks.  
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Figure 1: Bank Failure Cost to DIF (USD) Millions from 2009 to 2016 in USA. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of Bank Failures from 2009 to 2016 in USA. 
 
In summary, the stringent Basel III regulations were able to increase the capital requirements for banks, 
which systematically prime banks to be more efficient, thus hindering their growth. Moreover, it doesn’t 
change the risk-weighting technique which was the main motive behind the subprime catastrophe. 
Nevertheless, Basel III is still relying on the bond rating agencies, as weights are allocated based on the 
rating. It also aims to be in accordance with banking regulations across the world. According to Saul 
Perez, 2014, some countries have different regulatory requirements. For example, in India, they have 
better regulatory frameworks compared to Basel III. However, some past studies suggested that, when 
regulations are sought to be harmonised across the world, they tend to move towards the worst 
regulations. In addition, according to Saul Perez, 2014, some economist has suggested that Basel III 
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Accord is likely to hurt a country’s growth by keeping the infrequent tied up for less and developing nations.              
However, the Malaysian monetary system includes a variety of financial institutes to serve the wide range 
and complex needs of the national economy. The Malaysian financial system comprises of conventional 
and Islamic banking and financial institution. Even though, banking and financial institution may sound 
the same, however, according to Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM), not all banks has full banking license 
for example, Malaysia Building Society Berhad is a Scheduled Institution under the Banking and Financial 
Institution Act and Bank Rakyat is still on biggest Islamic Co-Operative Bank. Both of the banking and 
financial institutions, co-exists and functions in par with each other. The stability and growth of the banking 
and financial institutions in the country is a reflection of the concrete development of the nation’s financial 
sector itself. It indicates that the banking and financial institutions are vital for a nation’s development.  
 
In the recent years, Malaysia’s monetary structure has experienced a global financial catastrophe. 
However, the global financial crisis experienced by Malaysia is partly being helped by monetary mediators 
on cross border capital. The well-developed regulatory and the governance administrations as well as 
with a well-capitalized banking system, it will further strengthen Malaysia’s financial sector. Nevertheless, 
the stress tests may result in the financial institutions being robust on the economic shocks. Moreover, 
other risks faced by the banking system generally are those connected to quick financing evolution, rising 
house prices, and high domestic leverage, which call for improvements on the observations of the 
domestic leverage. Table 2 below, shows an overview of the number of licensed banks and financial 
institutions under the preview of BNM as at 31st December 2016. Primarily The Malaysian Banking and 
Financial Institutions comprises of Islamic, Commercial, International Islamic, Investment and Other 
Financial Institutions.  
 
Table 2 List of Licensed Banks and Financial Institutions in Malaysia (as at 2016) 
Banking and Financial Institutions Malaysian Controlled 
Institutions (L) 
Foreign Controlled 
Institutions (F) 
Total 
Islamic 10 6 16 
Commercial  7 21 28 
International Islamic  0 3 3 
Investment 11 0 11 
Other Financial Institutions  2 0 2 
Total  30 30 60 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (2016) 
 
The Malaysian financial sector consists of 30 locally controlled institutions and 30 foreign controlled 
institutions. They are all very well established organizations with high level of governance whereby they 
are monitored constantly and supervised timely by the Central Bank of Malaysia. These banks are 
separated into four main sections, namely; Islamic, Commercial, International Islamic, Investment and 
other financial institutions. The governance and supervision on risk administrations for financial 
institutions displays a high degree of compliance with global banking standards. The areas that have the 
potential for improvements are mainly, the enhancement of the framework, renewal of the policies and 
procedures of consolidated management and addressing the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (ISFA 
2013) (formerly known as Islamic Banking Act 1983) provisions that could theoretically reflect on 
independence of supervisory aspect for all financial institutions.  
 
As a conclusion, the Operational Risk Management in Malaysian Banking and Financial Institutions is 
defined as the risk or threat of subsequent losses from insufficient or unsuccessful internal processes, 
procedures, people, employee, stakeholders, systems and external events. On a different note, the 
421 
 
operational risk exists in various activities, products and services of banking and financial institutions and 
has the possibility to contribute to malpractices through numerous activities and business units within the 
banking industry.  
 
Literature Review  
 
In the world of digitization, where every information is stored digitally, it creates a problem of security for 
everybody. There a numerous cases on operational risk associated with cyber-attacks that effects the 
financial institutions all around the world due to the breach of security.  
 
On May 2017, a worldwide cyber-attack on computers running using Microsoft Window operating system 
took place. The attack was created by WannaCry ransomware crypto worm, which targeted user’s 
computers by encrypting the data in it and demanding ransom in the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. It’s a major 
attack on the Russian Central Bank. This incident was reported via Russian state media agency. Based 
on the report, the bank discovered that malware bulk emails were send to banks whereby, no resources 
were detected to be compromised. The bank reported that those monitoring the cyber-attacks found no 
compromising data resources of banking institutions. Moreover, according to Sam Jones (2017), countries 
such as Russia, Ukraine, India and Taiwan were the most seriously affected countries based on reports 
from the cyber security company known as the Kaspersky Lab.   
 
In February 2016, the Bangladesh Bank hackers managed to steal USD81 million from the Bangladesh 
Central Bank, in one of the largest bank heists in history. They cleared their tracks after hacking into the 
heart of global financial system Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), 
an international payment network used globally. SWIFT is a global messaging network which is used for 
most international money and security transfers. The heist was detected by the Bangladesh police 
department. Based on their investigation, they found evidence that the reason for the heist in the bank 
was because of using a second-hand USD10 network switch without a firewall to run its network. Without 
firewall, the hackers managed to access the bank’s entire infrastructure, including the SWIFT servers 
resulting in the failure of the network security. 
 
In April and May 2012, a huge loss in the trading transpired at J.P. Morgan’s Chief Investment Office 
which made dealings through its London branch. An approximate trading loss of USD$2 billion was 
declared, with the actual loss expected to be considerably higher. These events gave rise to a number of 
investigations to examine the firm’s operational risk management systems and internal controls.  As a 
result of the investigations, it was found that the bank is expected to lose US$800 million in its corporate 
segment in the second quarter of the year 2012, compared to the previous estimates that the segment 
would post US$200 million profit. The scenario began when the unit run by Chief Investment Officer, Ina 
Drew stepped down. A series of derivatives transactions involving credit default swaps (CDS) was 
entered, reportedly as part of the bank’s hedging strategy. The trader, Bruno Iksil, nicknamed as the 
London Whale, accumulated outsized CDS positions in the market. Due to that, some of the hedging 
losses were offset by taking US$1 billion in previous unrealized gains from the bank’s portfolio.  
 
In the early of September 2011, the Swiss Bank UBS announced that it had lost over US$2 billion dollars, 
as a results of unauthorized trading performed by Kweku Adoboli, a director of the bank’s Global Synthetic 
Equities Trading team in London.  The revelation could be the third largest loss of its kind in banking 
history. This implication resulted in the UBS being traded down 11% on the US stock exchange at trading, 
even as the European markets closed higher on that day.  
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Findings and Implications  
 
The half yearly permanent control exercise executed by the Operational Risk Officer in locally 
incorporated European Bank) whereby, bank found non-compliance issues of few departments in their 
daily tasks. Due to reputational issues, the researcher has refrained from mentioning the bank’s name. 
The Permanent Control exercise resulted due to the risk assessment severity and risk frequency rating 
process of each department during the annual review of the department’s work process of task flow. The 
function of risk assessment process in the organisation was to reduce the operational loss which might 
be a reputational risk of the bank.     
 
One of the issue is related to relief function. Customer Service Management Department was faced with 
disbursements by reason of corporate finance agreements. However, the Client Service Officer from the 
European Bank who was in charge of the disbursements was on medical leave for 2 months. In the 
absence of the Client Service Officer (CSO), there was no remedial action taken by the Head of 
Department in having a relief officer. As a result of this delay, the bank faced implications in onboarding 
of new clients with this incompliance activity. These lead to failure on the practice of Know Your Customer 
(KYC) policy. Regular review of due dates are not closely monitored for clients and trigger outdated 
assessment which may lead to jeopardise continuation of client-relationship. Apart from that, document 
custody of bank-client transactions was inappropriately retained. Due to that, the imposed financing 
surcharge on late payments and receipts data are not recorded into the client’s account. This clearly was 
a loss to the bank due to the improper management of the bank-client relationship in the organisation. 
The issues were serious enough to trigger a major operational risk implication to the bank, and the action 
to rectify this matter were conducted by stages.   
 
Policy and Procedures which falls under the supervision of the Organisation and Methods Department, 
their manuals were not reviewed for the past 3 years. Moreover, 28 procedure manuals and 7 policy 
manuals involved key business units. The general practice of banking institution is that each procedure 
must be approved by two committee members, namely Department Head and Executive Risk 
Management Committee (ERMC). However, the bank’s policy of practice is that they are approved by 
procedure level and additionally as final step by Board and Top Management. The actual process for 
reviewing each procedure and policy, then followed by the endorsement and approval takes a few months. 
The concerns in policy and procedure remained to contribute to operational risk implications to the 
organization as the approval of entire manual of the organisation took nearly 12 months for the review 
and approval process.         
    
Service Level Agreements (SLA) procedures and methods are in fact a quality process which uses internal 
customer inputs to set target. The SLA dashboard performances was not maintained and sustained as 
per agreements, and the bank as customer did not concern about the deliverables of the service provider. 
According to the agreement, it has a specified duration period, and it is clearly indicated and outlined as 
of the responsibility of each party including expectation outputs with performance measures. However, 
the bank officers who are supposed to be knowledgeable on the procedures for monitoring the 
performance of the services as well as problem solving procedures, was not aware of his responsibilities 
and was not given any training on that task. The officer was only being a custodian keeper of the SLAs 
documents and maintaining the timeline. All the deliverables of the service provider were kept as general 
records and was not subjected for review of their performance and continuous improvement of tasks.     
 
Adequate data management and retention will enable a successful Information Technology (IT) 
Management and Infrastructure. However, there were issues regarding the server room control system’s 
Air Condition and Ventilation where the temperature rose up to 82 degrees Fahrenheit during a normal 
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business day. The ideal server room temperature is in the range of 65⁰ to 70⁰ Fahrenheit (18⁰ – 21⁰ 
Celsius). Moreover, phone equipment application should have notified the IT Department Officers, Head 
of Department and the Chief Operating Officer (COO) on the rise in temperature. The phone application 
system would have considered fail when the server room temperature reached 82 degrees as there was 
scale setting to trigger alarm at 71⁰ – 73⁰ Fahrenheit. Incidentally, there was an alternative method, by 
way of email, where notification was sent to the respective person to highlight the issue. The relevant 
officers manage to handle the issue by rescaling the temperature in the server room on time and 
subsequently the IT department reported in their incident management report. The main matter is what 
the server’s internal thermometers were reading. This incident occurrence incurred additional costs to the 
organisation on the replacement of phone alarming application system and reading status due to increase 
in the server room temperature range. Referring to the above issue, the BNM Governor Datuk Muhammad 
Ibrahim (May 2016) mentioned about the prospective influence of technological interruptions to the 
monetary sector and advised that a predictable 10% to 40% of overall financial transaction revenues could 
be at risk by 2025 due to financial technology or fintech innovations. This may be caused by the 
commercial sectors incorporating software to deliver quicker and low-cost financial facilities.       
 
There was another non-compliance issue found in the Human Capital Department due to non-existence 
of Exit Form. It’s crucial to study details of the employee’s exit, on the foundation that condemnation is a 
cooperative act for the banks developments and assist working affiliation end on a good communication. 
However, it was found that the exit procedure for a particular employee was not conducted as per the 
organisation’s procedure. The Department’s manual states on exit procedure but there was no form as 
records to record proper exit of the employee.  The prime concern is that an employee’s departure with 
take along a few desk drawer cupboard keys and employee parking pass. As a result, the alternative keys 
could be retrieved by Administration Department’s from their safe keeping of spare keys, but the 
organization incurs additional cost for replacement of the parking access card.             
 
The governance and supervisory spotlight on Operational Risk Management by the Risk Officer, 
consideration has been continually cumulative. Considerations keen to the quantification of Operational 
Risk perspectives’ overwhelming influence has shown numerous big operational losses. Since the size of 
the above actions and their worrying impact on the monetary community as well as the rising likelihood 
of operational risk damages due to an ever-growing difficulty of products and processes, a sound 
monitoring and quantification of operational risk losses becomes increasingly essential.    
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis from the above five major issues rose from the inter-departmental connections, customer 
service management, organisation and methods, SLA business management, IT and human capital. The 
Operational Risk Officer produced a comprehensive report on monitoring and improvement plans for the 
departments. The issues conveyed in the banks internal Incident Management Reporting System, 
Compliance Department, Internal Audit Department with another set of report to External Auditor and 
regulator, is to ensure supervisory expectations on Banking and Financial Institution’s operational risk 
management outline and foundation for the Bank’s superintendent assessment. Subsequently, the 
Operational Risk Officer must handover the matter to Executive Risk Management Committee (ERMC) 
for considerations. ERMC is a monthly Risk Management Meeting chaired by Chief Executive Officer, 
Chief Risk Officer (CRO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), with senior managements of the organisation. 
The reporting is necessary due to the operational loss and reputational risk issues faced by the 
organisation. This is also to create awareness to address, top of the incident management and new 
improvement plans for the organisation for better operational risk mitigation plan. Moreover, the Basel III 
trend could also be observed in Malaysian Banking and Financial Institutions, as Malaysia being a 
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member of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and follows all BIS regulations. Hence the 
Basel III is strictly implemented in Malaysia. All these regulatory measures not only reduce the losses and 
Bank’s failures but also increases the confidence in banking services. A healthy banking system will help 
the nation in terms of economy, policy and development.        
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